Abstract-This
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly two decades, the rapid development of open source is a significant phenomenon in software industries. Open source software (OSS) is a sort of software whose sources codes are allowed software developers to share, to identify and correct errors, and redistribute [1] . The total of work invested into open source software projects is growing at an exponential rate and can be expected to continue growing at this rate for a while before slowing down [2] . In this background, more and more companies (e.g., Red Hat Inc) build commercial products based on open source software. Reference [3] called privately developed software based on publicly available source codes commercial open source software. Examples are Redhat Linux, MySQL, SugarCRM, Jaspersoft, and Alfresco. Some scholars make a fundamental distinction between commercial and community open source [4] . Community open source is open source software that is owned by a community, whose members don't derive direct revenues from the software. owned by a legal entity with the purpose of deriving revenues from the software.
Reference [5] divided software quality into two components: usability (includes ease of installation, documentation, user interface and level of technical support) and features (includes feature set, reliability, security etc). Commercial open source vendor improves the features or usability of the existing community open source software and generates a product that contains both publicly and privately developed components. By expanding the vertical differentiation model [6] . It found that the incentive towards software features (resp. usability) innovation is always higher (resp. lower) under BSD than under GPL. Reference [15] examined R&D competition for commercial open source providers under the GNU General Public License and found that: (i) although the GPL requires providers open the software codes, they may still have incentives to invest in software features under private optimum; (ii) the provider with high software usability has much higher incentive to invest in software features than the one with low usability does; (iii) from a public policy perspective, providers invest too little in software features under GPL. The above two papers study innovation incentives for commercial open source vendors, but both them don't consider competition between commercial open source and proprietary software producers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 solves the equilibrium solutions. Section 4 conducts comparative static analysis. Final part concludes the paper. technical expertise has higher willingness to pay for software usability than a user with higher technical expertise [5] , [8] , [16] .   when he/she uses FOSS, COSS and PS are respectively given by 
Solving (4), we obtain
The marginal consumer who is indifferent between using COSS and PS, indexed by 12  , is given by 12 uu  :
Solving (6), we obtain
To simplify the analysis, this paper assumes that: (i) 12 1   , he/she uses proprietary software. Therefore, the demand functions for the open source community, COSS provider and PS provider are respectively given by
The profit functions for COSS and PS providers are respectively given by
Note that the marginal costs for both commercial open source and proprietary software are assumed to equal zero.
III. THE OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS
The first-order conditions of (11) and (12) with respect to 1 p and 2 p are respectively given by 2 2 1 11
Solving (13) and (14), we obtain the equilibrium prices for COSS and PS
Substituting (15) , (12) 
  .
Journal of Communications Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2013
(9), (10), (11) and and (16) . This may explain, in the desktop operating system market, despite the Red Hat's Linux in terms of functionality isn't inferior to Microsoft's Windows, the disadvantage of software usability leads its price (resp. share or profitability) to be much lower (resp. less) than that of Microsoft.
IV. COMPARATIVE STATIC ANALYSIS
This part mainly analyzes how the usability of commercial open source software affects the equilibrium outcomes. To simplify the proofs, we set 1
Proposition 2.
(i) when The reason is that proprietary provider will lower its software price when the usability of commercial open source software increases and this guarantees it obtain more share. Moreover, commercial open source provider's profit increases (resp. decreases) in its software usability if the usability is small (resp. big) as in Fig. 7 . Finally, the profit of proprietary provider decreases as the usability of commercial open source software increases as in Fig. 8 
